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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT
OF THE STATE OF UT.AH
LUCILE BUCKLEY HALL,
Defendant-Appellant,

v.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
Administrator of the Estate of
George Buckley,
Plaintif!-Respondent.

Case No.

12837

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment under which certain
securities, held by appellant for nearly a decade as a gift from
her now deceased mother and sold by her nearly twenty years
after her father's death, were declared to be an asset of her
father's estate so that the proceeds of the sale were recoverable
by an administrator (appointed after the sale was complete) to

be distributed to the father's heirs.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court considered and disposed of the case on
only one issue, whether the ownership of the securities had
passed, by any process of legal or equitable transfer, from the
father directly or indirectly to the mother before or after the
1

farher's death. In that connection, the court ruled that appe). I
lant had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evi
dence that such transfer had occurred. The court concluded,
after trial on that issue, that appellant had not satisfied that
burden of proof. Appellant was ordered to deliver the securities and proceeds from their sale to the administrator.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
References to the record will be designated (R- ) . Ref.
erences to the transcript of testimony will be designated (T ).
The principals with whose conduct over some twenty·
five years we are concerned in this matter are George Buckley
(the "father") , Pearl Buckley (the "mother") , and their children, Bert, Gerald and Lucile. Lucile is the appellant here.

In 1937, the father acquired 5,500 shares of the capital
stock of Mercur Dome Gold Mining Company (Exhibits 1-5).
This stock will hereafter be referred to as the "securities". The
certificates were issued in his name alone, and he was the record
owner until February of 1969 (Exhibits 7-11 ) , nineteen years
after his death in 1950 (R. 19, T 121).
From at least 1944 on, the father was unable to work. He
had been burned, developed varicose veins with concomitant
ulceration, and frequently vomited (T-25, 120). Although the
mother was unskilled and in such poor health that she was "in
the hospital a lot" ( T 121), the family was forced to rely on
her work for its income (T 121, 122). They lived frugally
and developed little estate.
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In November of 1945, Lavon Christensen, a long time
friend of the Buckley family, visited the Buckley family in
Provo over a week-end. During her stay, she participated in a
discussion which, at the outset, was about Lavon's father who
had just been seriously injured in a mine accident. It developed
, into a general discussion about the importance of stock ownership and how to provide for family financial security when
normal channels of income are disrupted by death or incapacity
( T 27 et seq ) .
For this case, the father's words and actions during the
course of that discussion are most significant. In the context
of a colloquy about impending death, he said, "Lavon, I am
not a well man." Brooding over his ill health and poor financial situation, he said this:

"I just feel so bad because Pearl has to work.
I don't have much. We don't have much money, Lavon." (T 28).
In the mood reflected by that statement, mindful of his
own ill health and the burdtn it imposed on his wife, the father
then asked that the Mercur Dome certificates be brought to
him. He took the certificates out of their envelope and showed
them to Lavon. Turning to his wife, he then said:
"This is all we have got, Pearl. I want to give
this to you, and will you put it away. Someday it will
be good."
He then handed the securities to the mother, and she put them
away. (T 29).

3

With regard to the nature of the dominion exercised by
the mother before and after the ceremony above described, the
record is entirely clear. No witness testified about where the
certificates were kept before except appellant. She testified
they were kept, before this event, in a black box with other
documents the mother and father wanted to keep. Afterwards,
the mother put them in a different box. Appellant's exact testi·
.
mony wasth 1s:

"Q
A

Where did he keep the certificates?
Him and mom kept them in a black box. There
was one big box, and then she kept it in a smaller
one." (Our emphasis). (T 124-125).

There followed appellant's testimony, corroborative of Lavon's,
about the words of gift that the father used when he handed the
securities to the mother. This was stricken by the court as
violating the dead man's statute. The succeeding questions
related to the mother's different handling of the certificates
after the event:

"Q
A

All right now, where did she keep the stock after
that?
She had a big black box, like a chest, is was black.
She had painted it black.
And she had another one inside. And the reason
she had it that way is because she was afraid that
if one burned, two of them would make it safe.
She had all her genealogy and everything in the
box, and all of her other papers in this little
teeny one.

Q

Is that where she kept all of her odds and ends?

A

Yes, sir.

Q
A

And is that where she put the mining stock?
Yes." (T 127, 128). (Our emphasis).
4
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On cross examination ( T 15 2), no questions were addressed to this subject except those which confirmed that the
certificates were in the big box before the contended gift and
established that the father had access to them even afterwards.
It is perfectly evident from examination of the certificates (Exhibits 1-5 ) that somebody paid assessments against
the stock on May 21, 1947, and May 19, 1948. While the
record does not reveal from what source that money came, the
record does show that the father produced no income after
1944. If any presumption is justified, we must presume that
the mother generated the funds and used them to preserve
her asset.

The evidence clearly shows that the father knew where
the certificates were in 1947 and was able to put his hands on
them in that year when Gerald visited him. There was no apparent assertion of ownership by the father at that time even
if Gerald's testimony on the point, stricken by the trial court,
is considered (T 190). Nevertheless, appellant concedes that
the record shows the' certificates were not removed from the
common household after the 1945 event, and they were not
locked away from the father.
Finally, there was, after the father's death, a distribution
of his estate by action, if not by formal agreement, of his heirs.
Bert sold the father's car; Gerald took the father's ring, (T
148) . The mother kept, either as recognition that they had
already been given to her or as a part of the de facto distribution of the father's estate, the war bonds and the securities,
and gave each of the children "around a hundred and fifty
dollars" ( T-15 7). That this kind of distribution in fact occurred was stipulated to by counsel, ( T 149) .
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After the father's death, the mother clearly treated the
bonds and securities as if they were hers alone. She purporte<l
to give the securities to appellant, using words of gift and man.
ually delivering the certificates (T 82, 83). We will not dwell
on the overwhelming evidence of gift of the securities by the
mother to appellant, since the court disposed of the case purely I
on a finding that the securities never became the property oi I
the mother. She presumably gave the bonds to Gerald, since
they were "gone" at the time of her death, and Gerald got
them, (T 149, undisputed by Gerald). Curiously, the administrator has not joined Gerald in this action to mobilize estate
assets.

I

As further evidence of the degree to which the heirs considered that their de facto distribution of their parents' assets
was binding upon them and a fait accompli, Gerald Buckley
signed as a personal guarantor on appellant's application for
the bond which she was required to file with the issuer and
transfer agent to get the securities transferred to her name with·
out probate (R 71, 72; T 199). The bond which issued as a
result of the aforesaid application is in evidence (Defendant's
Exhibit 6) . On the assurance of that bond, the securities were
transferred to appellant early in 1969. At the time of transfer,
the securities had been in appellant's sole and exclusive posses·
sion for more than eight years, since September of 1966 (T
81, 82).
Some six months after the transfer and sale by appellant
of most of the securities, nineteen years after the death of the
father, and six years after the death of the mother, the respond·
ent administrator was appointed on the initiative of Gerald
and Bert, both of whom had accepted portions of their parents'
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property under the process of de facto distribution hereinabove
described and knew (since Gerald called appellant about it)
that appellant held the certificates. ( T 140).

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING
UPON APPELLANT THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE OWNERSHIP OF HER DONOR BY
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
We will comment on the nature and persuasive character
of the evidence of gift in subsequent discussion. At the outset,
however, we cite as error the court's insistence that Mrs. Hall
prove decisively that her claim to the securities was valid. It
should be noted, in this connection, that the administrator here
filed a complaint asserting itself to be the rightful owner of
securities which had been in the undisturbed possession of the
mother for ten years and of appellant for an additional nine
years. Each of them had exercised dominion over the stock
openly and notoriously with the full knowledge of the other
heirs of the father. At the time of the father's death, the securities were in the only space on earth the mother could consider
her own, a little box where she kept documents she considered
her own and to which she attached value.
lo the face of this history of dominion by appellant and
her mother; the trial court proceeded by ordering the defendant to go forward with the evidence, in the absence of any
proof of respondent of any kind, and to demonstrate, not by a
Preponderance of the evidence but clearly and convincingly,
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that her mother was the lawful owner of the securities at the
time she gave them to appellant (R 133, R 140, Conclusion
No. 3).
The specific problem which confronts us here (a contest
between an administrator and an heir in possession of property once owned by the deceased and claiming it as a donee or
purchaser) has been before the courts repeatedly. The West
Digest Key Number for the reported cases is Excutors and
Administrators 59. There is certainly some confusion in the
cases about the degrees to which the burden shifts in the course
of trial. There is virtually no support, however, for the proposition that the person in possession must proceed.
The basic concept that the plaintiff must prove his case
applies in this situation as in every other. A case very much in
point is Whitenight v. Whitenight, 278 A 2d 912. In that
case, the facts were strikingly similar to ours except that the
securities were bonds. In commenting upon the burden of
proof question, the court said:
'The burden of proof is upon anyone who claims
property in the possession of another to establish facts
essential to his claim of ownership."
and imposed that burden on the administrator. Similar rulings
on the point were made in In Re Santalucia's Estate, 199 NYS
2d 285, and In Re Donsavage's Estate, 218 A 2d 112.
It is true, of course, that the certificates here in question

were not endorsed by the father at the time of his purported
gift to the mother. The trial court clearly ruled however, that
endorsement was not a necessary component of an effective gift
( T 17 3, R 124) and that the certificates in this case could
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effectively have been given by the father to the mother without endorsement at the time of the gift or during his lifetime.
That ruling was soundly based on this court's decision in Harrington v. Interstate Fidelity Building and Loan Association,
91 u 74, 64 p 2d 577.
In In Re Hill's Estate, 8 Ill app 2nd 243, 174 NE 2d 233
( 1961), the court was concerned with another case where the
subject of the claimed gift was stock and the certificates had
not been endorsed nor the corporate records changed by the
date of the donor's death. It was the contention of the administrator that the mere introduction of the unendorsed certificates
was a sufficient showing of ownership to shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. Not so, said the court:
"Possession of the certificates was clearly in the
widow. The fact that it remained in the books in the
name of decedent, the claimed donor, does not defeat
the gift or affect the title of the donee. . ."
"In the situation here involved, the introduction
of the unendorsed certificate and the showing that it
remained on the corporate books in the name of the
decedent, did not, of themselves, constitute sufficient
evidence to show ownership in the estate."

In the instant case, of course, the administrator put on no evidence initially. The appellant, having been in possession for
almost nine years, was obliged to proceed from the beginning
and to prove her donor's title by clear and convincing evidence.
It is at least interesting that, in cases concerned with the
disposition of a joint tenancy account where the survivor claims
a gift, the courts require the administrator to prove the lack of
donative intent by "clear and convincing evidence" (see Estate
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of Zengerle, 2 Ill app. 3d 98, 27 6 NE 2d 128). The mother

and father in this case were poor, frugal, and married to adver.
sity. They could hardly afford a joint safe deposit box, but they
treated the black box in the bedroom as if it were one, and
they committed what treasures they had to that box in the
spirit of joint depositors. How odd that the law would choose
to discriminate against people in their circumstances.
We submit that the burden imposed by the court in the
instant case was entirely improper. If any party had obligation
to prove its right, it was plaintiff-respondent.
POINT

II

WHATEVER THE BURDEN OF PROOF, APPELLANT ADEQUATELY PROVED THE TITLE
OF HER DONOR EITHER BY VIRTUE OF
GIFT FROM THE FATHER OR BY VIRTUE OF
A DE FACTO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT PROBATE.
There are, of course, two bases on which appellant con·
tends the mother's ownership of the securities as of 1960 has
been conclusively proved. First, the father gave the securities
to the mother in 1945, and second, the securities were distrib·
uted to the mother by concerted conduct of the heirs after
the father's death. We will consider these bases separately.
A.

EVIDENCE OF GIFT

The ceremony by which the gift from father to mother
was consummated took place in the presence of several wit·
nesses. Appellant's testimony about the event was ruled inad·
missible, but Lavon Christensen recalled the incident vividly
The father handed the certificates to the mother while uttering
10

words conveying unmistakable donative intent. The mother
accepted the gift and thereafter kept the certificates in her own
box. Each of the elements of gift (words of donation, physical
delivery of the corpus of the gift, and acceptance by the donee)
is fully established.
There is simply no contradiction of the appellant's evidence on these points in the record. It is difficult to comprehend how evidence can fall short of "clear and convincing" if
it is full and undisputed as to every element of gift identified
in the cases. There were, however, two factors the court specifically mentioned (R 122) in commenting that appellant's
evidence fell short of the clear and convincing standard.
The first factor mentioned is that the certificates were not
endorsed at the time of the purported gift or, indeed, during
the father's lifetime. Why the lack of endorsement assumed
such major proportions in the court's mind is hard to fathom
in view of the provisions of Section 18-3-9 which, at the time
of the gift in 1950, read in part as follows:
The delivery of a certificate by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner thereof without the endorsement requisite for the transfer of the
certificate and the shares represented thereby but with
intent to transfer such certificate or shares shall impose
an obligation, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, upon the person so delivering to complete
the transfer by making the necessary indorsement.
Moreover, this court, in Harrington (supra), held that
dorsement was not a necessary ingredient of a gift of stock;
the trial court itself, preliminarily and during the trial,
nounced its conviction that endorsement was unnecessary.
11

enand
anEr:-

dorsement is, on any theory, a technical requirement which the
donor here was unlikely to have comprehended. Frequent reference is made in the record to the fact that the certificates here in
evidence were the only stock certificates he ever owned.
We submit that, under the facts of this case and the controlling law, a court which refuses to be convinced of
a gift in the absence of the donor's endorsement is, in essence,
holding that there can be no gift without endorsement. The
court is, therefore, refusing to follow the statutory and decisional law applicable to the case, and this is error.
The second factor mentioned by the court as having influenced it in concluding that no gift from the father to the
mother was consummated is the father's "failure to divest himself of physical control of the certificates."
This brings us, of course, to the whole question of what
constitutes delivery for the purposes of gifts between cohabitat·
ing spouses. Is it really necessary, for a gift from husband to
wife to be completed, that the subject of the gift be removed
from their mutual home or locked away from the donor by
the donee? We submit that this is neither the practice nor the
law in our society.
The general law on this subject is reviewed in Arizona ·
Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wagner, 251 P 2d 897. The
Arizona court summarized the law as to delivery, where the
gift is between spouses, as follows:
"Open and visible change of possession or re·
moval of the subject matter of the gift from the corn·
mon residence is not necessary to effect a valid gitt
where the donor and donee reside together."
12

To the same effect, see Bishop v. Bishop, 359 SW 2d 869,
where the gift was of an automobile and furniture which remained in the home of the parties.
In In Re Estate of Holmes, 200 A 2d 745, (Penna 1964),
delivery of certificates to establish a gift was held sufficient
where they were placed in a safe (in the marital home) to
which both spouses had access even though the donee-wife
never saw or handled the certificates.
In the instant case, the uncontradicted evidence is that
the mother placed the certificates after the 1945 event in the
only space on earth (the little box) she could think of as her
own. It is true that, on one occasion, the father took the certificates from that place to show them to his son, but there is
no evidence that he then said or did anything with reference
to them inconsistent with his previous assertion that they were
a gift to the mother.

We submit that the court's finding that the father retained physical possession is against the evidence, and the conclusion that there was not an effective delivery, in the context
of this family's mode of life, was against the law.

B.

EVIDENCE OF DE FACTO DISTRIBUTION

In the Statement of Facts section of this brief, we have
reviewed the considerable evidence that a distribution of the
property of the father was made shortly after his death by concerted action of his heirs. In view of the straightened circumstances of the family (which consisted of only the father and
mother at the time of his death) it is hardly surprising that no
formal probate proceedings were instituted. The conduct of
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the heirs, including the distribution of a ring to Gerald, a car
to Bert, and certain monies to all the children, together with ,
the mother's retention of the securities, was clearly intended as
a final and effective distribution. Actually, respondent stipulated that there was a dividing up or distribution of the
father's property by the heirs shortly after his death.
It appears to be the position of the respondent that such
a division of a deceased's property by his heirs cannot have
any legal effect. We submit that the law is to the contrary. Jn
the era of our national development when estates of conse·
quence were the exception rather than the rule, de facto distributions of the kind which occurred in this case were common
and favored.

In Faulkner 1 Faulkner, 23 ARIZ. 313, 203 Pac 56, the
court commented on a course of conduct by heirs which parallels the conduct of the heirs in this case. In holding that the
division of property so made vested legal title in the distributees, the court said:
"Settlement of estates by agreement between the
the heirs without administration where fairly made and
where the rights of creditors are not affected is favorable by the law."
1•

In similar litigation, Browne v. Porsche, 433 MICH 492,
5 NW 1011, the court said:
"Formal proceedings for the settlement of an
estate are never necessary if all parties concerned can
agree to dispense with them. Family arrangements for
this purpose, it is said, are favorites of the law, and.
when fairly made, are never allowed to be disturbed
by the parties or by others for them."
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See also, in this connection, Estate of Taft v. Arida, 305 P 2d

438.
ln all these cases, the courts have made it clear that a
fundamental purpose for probate is to protect the rights of
creditors. In Faulkner, the court considered it reasonable to
assume that creditors were not concerned where none had appeared within eight years after the death. In the instant case,
all the testimony is that the father had no debts at the time of
his death, that no creditors were in any way involved. Moreover, 22 years have now lapsed since the death of the father,
and no creditor has been heard from.
On the basis of the evidence of de facto distribution, we
submit that, in 1960 when the mother gave the securities to
appellant, neither Bert nor Gerald could have prevailed in an
effort to wrest the securities from their mother. By virtue of
the conduct of the heirs, acting in concert, title to the securities
was vested in the mother and she was free to make such gift as
she desired.

POINT

III

APPELLANT EFFECTIVELY PROTECTED THE
ESTATE OF HER FATHER BY CORPORATE
BOND, AND ACTION OF THE RESPONDENT
SHOULD BE AGAINST THE ISSUER OF THE
SECURITIES AND ITS TRANSFER AGENT.
By the time the complaint in this matter was filed, appellant had already effected a transfer of the securities from her
father's name to her own and had sold most of the shares in
the public market. In order to protect anyone who might estab-
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lish a better title to the shares being transferred than
appellant's, she filed with the issuer and its transfer agent a
corporate bond which is in evidence.

The real contention of the respondent in this case is that
the issuer, wrongfully and without adequate evidence of appel·
lam's right to the shares, transferred the shares to appellant as
a matter of corporate record. That transfer was a nullity and
entirely void as against the claim of the rightful owner. If the
estate is in fact the rightful owner of the shares, its primary :
remedy is against the issuer which must now replace the shares'
and show the estate to be the owner on its records.
!

The issuer has, of course, a remedy against appellant and
against the corporate surety. What the estate is entitled to is
to be placed in the position it would have been in if the offen·
sive transfer had not been made. That is, the estate is entitled
to have restored to it 5500 shares of the issuer's stock. Respond·
ent has never proceeded against the issuer or its transfer agent
Respondent should not be permitted to wait 19 years after the
death of the father and then choose between an action to re·
cover the stock and an action to recover the proceeds of its
sale from one who has been a bonafide claimant in possession
for almost a decade.

CONCLUSION
The case before the court is one which presents a number
of features which give it a unique flavor. There is an unusual
lapse of time between the death of the father and any effort
to marshal his assets or distribution. The organization of the
family, where the father was unemployed and the mother be I
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came the breadwinner, is uncommon. The practice of the
mother and father to keep the things they treasured in a box
in the bedroom may not be the usual practice of people whose
estates are probated. There are no cases we have found which
present all the features of the one now before the court. It is
a situation where the equities become important. Under all the
facts, we submit that the securities became, by legal or equitable
transfer, the property of the mother after the father's death.
In view of the long undisturbed possession by the mother and
the additional decade of undisturbed possession by appellant,
the trial court unreasonably imposed a heavy burden of proof
upon appellant and unreasonably failed to
as clear and
convincing proof the evidence presented at the trial and in the

course of litigation.
The decision and judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Frank J. Allen
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATI
3 5 1 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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